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Abstract
The paper models foreign capital inflow from the developed to the developing countries in
a stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) framework. Under some regularity conditions, the
existence of the solutions to the SDP problem is proved and they are then obtained by numer-
ical technique because of the non-linearity of the related functions. A number of comparative
dynamic analyses explore the impact of parameters of the model on dynamic paths of capital
inflow, interest rate in the international loan market and the exchange rate.
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1 Introduction
The paper develops a simple model of foreign capital inflow in a multi period dynamic programming
frame work. Typically capital flows from the developed to the developing countries owing to a higher
rate of return in the latter because of scarcity of capital and thus a higher marginal product of
capital than in the developed countries which are capital rich with a lower marginal product of
capital.1 The foreign capital supplements the domestic resources of the developing countries for
achieving a higher rate of capital formation and hence higher rate of economic growth. Generally
developing countries are characterized by consistent current account deficit. This together with
a higher interest rate creates a natural condition for flow of capital from the developed to the
developing countries. The inflow to the borrowing country helps appreciate the domestic currency
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1Marginal product of capital is directly related to interest rate in general and exactly equal in a competitive market
framework.
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followed by rise in asset prices and local goods prices which via favourable fiscal conditions further
encourages domestic credit creation. Repayment of loans in the next period has an adverse effect
on exchange rate resulting into depreciation of exchange rate. This does not matter as long as
inflow is sufficient. The crisis situation occurs particularly when the rate of capital inflow reaches
a plateau or the global investors find a new country with even a higher rate of return then the
new paradigm looks shop worn; a sudden stop a la Calvo (1998) to capital inflow or a reversal
of current account balance leading to asset price contraction, decreased domestic investment and
the economy adjusts backwards. In an extreme situation depreciation of domestic currency makes
debt servicing difficult which can lead to a foreign exchange crisis or banking crisis or both (see
Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Wolf, 2008). 2 The crisis may further
get aggravated by bad macroeconomic management on fiscal and monetary fronts. The problem
of debt servicing arises because capital inflow to developing countries are typically pegged in hard
currency which has been termed as ’original sin’ (Eichengreen and Hausman, 1999; Eichengreen,
Hausman and Panizza, 2005).
In a simple two period model the potential of financial crisis emanating from the depreciation of
exchange rate at the time of repayment of foreign currency loans was modeled by Marjit, Das
and Bardhan (2007). The argument is based on simple text book explanation of terms of trade
effect based on trade theoretic argument as in Caves et al 1993; Helpman and Krugman, 1989.
When all the producers sell in the international market at a given world price the combined supply
reduces the world price though no individual seller or even a country can affect world price. The
same argument applies in the context of capital inflow in a two period framework. It is argued
that the terms of trade effect may dominate leading to a financial crisis. Basak, Das and Marjit
(2012) extended the model by introducing repayment of previous period borrowing. It adds multi
period dynamics in the structure for a better understanding of the possibility of crisis. Costinot
et al. (2014) has argued for capital control on the basis of dynamic terms of trade in the same
spirit as in this paper. The present paper is a formalization of the process of capital inflow in
an infinite horizon set up with micro foundations of the choice problem of the agents - borrowers
and lenders. The model investigates the effect of an increase in the perception of risk of default
of international loan in the lending country, shift in the expectation of the future exchange rate
or decreased productivity in the domestic sector in the borrowing country on capital inflow. The
issue pertaining to the origin of the financial crisis in the process of inflow is also discussed.
With this short introduction the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates a model of capital
inflow in a two country setup, a borrowing country and a lending country. From the individual
optimization exercise we derive equilibria in the two markets, viz. international loan market and
the foreign exchange market which are then solved for the interest rate in the international loan
market and exchange rate by numerical method. Proofs of the existence of the solutions are given in
the Appendices. In section 3, we undertake comparative dynamic exercises of changes in parameter
values. The final section concludes.
2General empirical evidence can be found in Bordo and Meissner (2005); Bussie`re et al (2004) while country specific
evidence can be found in Dominguez and Tesar (2005), Goldfajn and Minella (2005), Noland (2005). East Asian crisis
of 1997 has been extensively discussed by Allen and Gale (2007), Krugman (1998), Gorton (2008), Rakshit (2002).
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2 The Model
We consider a two-country model with one borrowing (developing) and another lending (developed)
country. The two country framework is an abstraction from the reality where the two countries
represent two country groups. The borrowing country group is capital scarce, thus has a higher
marginal product of capital and hence a higher domestic interest rates whereas the lending country
has lower domestic interest rates as this group is capital rich. 3 Actual borrowing-lending takes
place through banks or financial intermediaries, there is no direct lending. A typical bank in the
developing country borrows from both the domestic and international markets and lends to domestic
production sector while a typical bank in the developed country borrows from domestic sector and
lends to both the domestic and international borrowers. 4 The developing country banks have to
repay the foreign debt along with the interest rate in the next period denominated in the lending
country’s currency, i.e., hard currency. International loan market is assumed to be competitive so
that the international loan rate is given to both lending country and borrowing country banks. We
do not consider the determination of domestic borrowing or lending rates of interest in the model.
It is only the interest rate on foreign borrowing/ lending and the exchange rate that are determined
in this model. Each bank in both the developed and the developing countries maximize discounted
expected utility over infinite horizon, specifically an intertemporal mean-variance utility function,
by choice of their portfolio of borrowing and lending.
2.1 Developed country
Competitive banking in the developed country ensures that all banks are symmetric so that each
one of them raise the same amount of deposit, assumed to be KDt in each period. Number of banks
is assumed to be mD. We define, at time period t rDt = interest rate paid on deposits, R
D
t = interest
rate on domestic loans, R∗t = interest rate on international loan, Ft = total funds at the disposal
of the bank. The bank lends µt fraction in the international market the rest in the international
market with a risk of default t for the foreign loan defined as
t =
1 with probability pt,0 with probability 1− pt, 0 ∈ [0, 1).
Domestic loan has no risk of default. Total funds for lending Ft is the sum of accumulated profit
from the previous period and the amount of new deposits and is given by:
Ft = Ft−1[(1− µt−1)(1 +RDt−1) + (µt−1)(1 +R∗t−1)t−1]− (1 + rDt−1)KDt−1 +KDt . (2.1)
3The borrowing country group resembles the emerging market economies among the developing countries with
high growth potential such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa etc. These economies are attractive location for
international capital compared to the least developed countries of Africa or Asia.
4In recent times a few emerging market economy firms have been borrowing directly in the international market,
but major part of international borrowing takes place via banks or consortium of banks. External Commercial
Borrowing, American Depository Receipts are two prominent examples of such direct borrowing by Indian firms in
the international market.
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The expected profit of each bank in the current period is given by,
E[piDt ] = Ft[(1− µt)(1 +RDt ) + µt(1 +R∗t )E(t)]− (1 + rDt )KDt ,
and the variance by,
Vt(pi
D
t ) = F
2
t µ
2
t (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t).
A typical bank chooses its portfolio to maximize its intertemporal expected profit adjusted for risk
(measured by variance). The instantaneous utility (mean-variance utility function) of a bank in
the developed country at time period t is
ΩDt = Et(pi
D
t )−
γ
2
Vt(pi
D
t ). (2.2)
The bank maximizes
[ΩDt +B
D[Et(pi
D
t+1)−
γ
2
Vt(pi
D
t+1)] +B
D2[Et(pi
D
t+2)−
γ
2
Vt(pi
D
t+2)]+
BD
3
[Et(pi
D
t+3)−
γ
2
Vt(pi
D
t+3)] + . . . ,
by choice of µt subject to the funds constraint, where B
D is the discount factor assumed same for
all time periods.
The above optimality problem is solved by Bellman optimization technique.[5] The problem of the
bank can be stated in the Bellman framework as
V D(Ft) = maxµt{ΩDt +BDEt(V D(Ft+1))}, (2.3)
subject to fund constraint (2.1) where V D(Ft) denotes the value function assumed to be stationary.
Since (i) the utility function is concave and the constraint function is linear, (ii) the utility function
is time separable in contemporaneous control and state variables, and (iii) current decision affect
current and future utilities but not the past ones, Bellman principle can be applied here to solve the
dynamic programming problem. In particular, solution would be of the form of quadric function
since the utility function is quadratic. 5 So we let,
V D(Ft) = a+ bFt + cF
2
t , (2.4)
a, b , c are the coefficients of the value function to be determined. It is to be noted that the value
function needs to be concave to have a unique maximum which is satisfied if c is negative.
Theorem 1 Under the linear quadratic framework, for the existence of unique positive solution
µt for all t it is necessary that
1
(1+RDt )
2 < B
D < min(1,
(Z2t+(1+R
∗
t )
2Vt(t))2
(1+RDt )
2[(3/2)Z2t (1+R
∗
t )
2Vt(t)+((1+R∗t )2Vt(t))2]
)
whenever Zt = (1 +R
∗
t )Et(t)− (1 +RDt ) > 0. Further, for γ ∈ (γ0, γ1), for some 0 < γ0 < γ1, the
solution µt ∈ (0, 1) exists for all t and is given by
µ∗t =
Zt[(1 +B
Db) + 2BDcFt(1 +R
D
t )− 2BDcrDtk]
Ft[γ(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)− 2BDc(Z2t + (1 +R∗t )2Vt(t))]
(2.5)
with
rDtk = (1 + rt)K
D
t −KDt+1,
where b and c are given in (5.11) and (5.8).
5Value function can be approximated by Kalman filtering techniques, but for simplicity a quadratic value function
is assumed to solve the Bellman equation.
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For the proof of this theorem please see Appendix A. The intuition of the theorem obtains from
the fact that as µ increases from zero to positive values utility from out of lending increases but the
marginal utility of lending falls with rising γ (i.e., rising perception of risk) and at a high enough γ
the maxima of the utility function achieves at some µ < 1. Thus for a high enough γ, µ is bounded
at unity from above.
2.2 Developing country
We also assume competitive banking in the developing country with total number of banks mU
each of which is symmetric. Number of firms which borrow from each bank are normalized at
unity. A typical bank raises a fraction λt from the international market at an interest rate R
∗
t and
the rest from the domestic market at an interest rate rut . These funds are lent to domestic sector
at an interest rates Rut with a risk of default arising out of productivity shock denoted by ηt. A
typical bank is assumed to hedge against currency fluctuations by buying a currency forward. Let
us define et = spot exchange rate at t, e
f
t = forward market exchange rate, P
f
t = price of the
forward contract at t. Gt = funds available to each bank at t (accumulated from past profits and
new deposit raised) and is given by
Gt = ηt−1(1 +RUt−1)Gt−1 −KUt−1[(1− λt−1)(1 + rUt−1) + λt−1(1 +R∗t−1)Et(
et
et−1
)] +KUt .
The profit of each bank in the developing country is thus given by
piUt = ηt(1 +R
U
t )Gt −KUt [(1− λt)(1 + rUt ) + λt(1 +R∗t )(
et+1
et
)]
+(1 +RUt )Gt(
et+1
eft
− 1)− P ft , (2.6)
When foreign exchange markets are either informationally efficient or whenever risk premium is a
non decreasing function of the level of transaction, forward contracts are priced in such a way that
marginal benefit from the contract equals marginal cost of the contract. The last two terms in (2.6)
vanish. Hence, the instantaneous mean variance utility function is given by
ΩUt = Et(pi
U
t )−
βVt(pi
U
t )
2
= Et(ηt)(1 +R
U
t )Gt −KUt [(1− λt)(1 + rUt ) + λt(1 +R∗t )Et(
et+1
et
)]
−β
2
[(1 +RUt )
2G2tVt(ηt) + (K
U
t )
2λ2t (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)].
The problem of the bank in the Bellman framework is given by
V U (Gt) = maxλt{ΩDt +BUEt(V U (Gt+1)}. (2.7)
subject to fund constraint (2.2) where V U (Gt)is the value function assumed to be stationary and
BU is the discount factor. As in the case of developed country the Bellman principle can be applied
here on the quadratic value function to solve the dynamic programming problem. Thus,
V U (Gt) = x+ yGt + zG
2
t , (2.8)
with x, y, z to be determined by equating coefficients. 6
6Again, the parameter z has to be negative for the same reason as explained earlier.
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Theorem 2 Under the linear quadratic framework for the existence of unique positive solution λt
for all t it is necessary that 1
3(1+RUt )
2Vt(ηt)+(1+RUt )
2(Et(ηt))2
< BU < 1
(1+RUt )
2[Vt(ηt)+(Et(ηt))2]
, whenever
At = (1 + r
U
t ) − (1 + R∗t )Et( et+1et ) > 0. Further, there exists βs neither very large nor very small
(in an interval, (β0, β1), for some 0 < β0 < β1) such the solution λt ∈ (0, 1) exists for all t and is
given by
λ∗t =
At[(1 +B
Uy) + 2BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)Gt − 2BUzrUtk]
KUt [(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)(β − 2BUz)− 2BUzA2t ]
(2.9)
with
rUtk = K
U
t (1 + r
U
t )−KUt+1
where y and z are given in (6.17) and (6.5).
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix B.
It may be noted that for a small value of β (implying low perception of risk) allows the developing
country banks to borrow larger amount, possibly even λ > 1, as long as R∗t remains lower than the
level given by At > 0. On the other hand, if β is too high then λ can become zero or negative.
Thus for a solution of λ ∈ (0, 1) one must choose a β ∈ (β0, β1), for some 0 < β0 < β1.
2.3 Equilibrium: Existence and Characterization
There are two markets in this model, viz. international loan market and the foreign exchange
market. Total supply of loans in the international market is the sum total of loans by the developed
country banks and total demand for international loans is the sum total of demand by individual
banks in the developing country. In equilibrium aggregate demand equals aggregate supply at each
t so that
mDµ∗tFt =
mUλ∗tKUt
et
. (2.10)
The R.H.S is aggregate demand and the L.H.S. is aggregate supply of loans. It may be noted that
developing country banks cannot raise loans from the international market at their home currency,
it has to be in hard currency, such as US Dollar or EURO. The equilibrium in the foreign exchange
market is obtained by the equality of the demand for foreign exchange comprising of repayment of
loans of previous period and the supply comprising of net exports plus current period loan. The
current net exports is assumed to be a linear increasing function of current period exchange rate,
Nt = −N0 +N1et (2.11)
where N1 equals relative price of foreign goods (imports) vis-a`-vis home goods (exports), with
N1 > 0 and both N0, N1 following uniform distribution in the intervals (N01, N02) and (N11, N12)
respectively and N0 > 0. Stochastic coefficients of the net export function adds dynamics to the
model. It is clear from (2.11) that net exports is actually rising function of price of foreign goods
expressed in home currency relative to price of home goods. It may be noted that at zero exchange
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rate or a very low price of foreign goods relative to home goods there is a negative net exports, i.e.
there is positive imports. The equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is given by
−N0 +N1et + m
Uλ∗tKUt
et
=
mU (1 +R∗t−1)λ∗t−1KUt−1
e∗t−1
. (2.12)
The LHS gives the supply of foreign exchange while the RHS the demand for foreign exchange.
Equations (2.10), (2.12) (with substitutions from (2.5), (2.9)) simultaneously determine, R∗t and
e∗t at each t corresponding to realizations of random shocks in the respective periods. Accordingly
we get the dynamics of capital inflow, interest rate and exchange rate. Existence of equilibrium
solutions are given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions of Theorems 1 and 2 there exist unique positive solutions to
(2.10) and (2.12) provided
N20 > 4N1m
UKUt (2.13)
For the proof of this theorem please see Appendix C.
The value function in each case is assumed to be stationary. If c < 0 and z < 0 then the value
function is concave which in turn ensures existence of unique maximum for each of the borrowing
and lending country banks respectively. It readily follows from (5.9)that c < 0 if and only if
BD(1 + RDt )
2 > 1 and BD(1 + RDt )
2 <
(Z2t+(1+R
∗
t )
2Vt(t))2
[(3/2)Z2t (1+R
∗
t )
2Vt(t)+((1+R∗t )2Vt(t))2
and 0 < BD < 1.
So the condition is easily satisfied provided BD is small enough to make the product less than
unity. Similarly z < 0 if and only if 0 < BU (1 +RUt )
2Et(η
2) < 1 for the developing country banks.
We need another condition on the interest rate on international loan for positive amount of foreign
borrowing by developing country banks. The developed country bank lends only when the expected
return from the loan is greater than the return from domestic deposits i.e.,
(1 +R∗t )Et(t) > (1 +R
D
t ) is also a necessary condition for µ
∗
t > 0.
The developing country bank borrows only when the international interest rate adjusted for the
exchange rate is less than the domestic interest rate i.e.,
(1 +R∗t )Et(
et+1
et
) < (1 + rUt ) is also a necessary condition for λ
∗
t > 0.
Combining these two conditions we have
(1 +RDt )
Et(t)
< (1 +R∗t ) <
(1 + rUt )
Et(
et+1
et
)
. (2.14)
In the next section, the endogenous variables, viz. R∗t , et and capital inflow are numerically solved
for given initial values and parameters of the model and explain how the equilibria behave over
time.
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2.4 Simulation
The two equations, (2.10) and (2.12)solve for equilibrium values of R∗t and µt for a given parametric
configuration and exogenous variables. We run the simulation for 30 time periods. It may be noted
that the algorithm used for finding the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables employs a
version of E-M Algorithm (Estimation Maximization employed in Maximum Likelihood Estimation
in econometrics) in a dynamic setup. Given below the initial values chosen for two countries and
values for parameters of the model equilibrium values are calculated using the algorithm provided
in Appendix D. We have set BD = 0.91, BU = 0.8, G0 = 10,K
U = 20 and F0 = 10,K
D = 10. In
the entire analysis we have assumed that the new deposits raised KUt and K
D
t are constant over
time.
Table 1: Initial values of stochastic parameters
E( et+1et ) E(t) V (t) V (
et+1
et
) E(ηt) V (ηt) N01 N02 N11 N12
0.92 0.94 0.09 0.25 0.85 0.09 1100 1200 15 18
Table 2: Initial values of parameters and variables
γ β mD mU KD KU RD rD RU rU R∗0 e0 G0 F0
4 1 10 100 10 20 0.05 0.04 0.2 0.15 0.14 75 10 10
The equilibrium R∗t , e∗t and total capital inflow (international borrowing/ lending) for 30 time
period obtained via simulation are provided in Figs. 1 through 3 below.
Figure 1: Capital Inflow
8
Figure 2: et
Figure 3: R∗t
It is evident from the above figures that capital inflow and exchange rate follow stationary pattern
with a shift in the trajectory of the former between the period between 15 and 20. The international
interest rate shows a rising trend in a small band. This is because of the fact that a static expectation
of next period exchange rate with a value less than unity implies banks in the developing country
finds it optimal to borrow from the international market. The ever increasing demand for loans
raises the interest rate over time. In the process the role of dynamic terms of trade operates via
(2.12). If there is an adverse supply shock in the foreign exchange market (due to, say a deficit
in the balance of trade) then the second component on the L.H.S. of (2.12) has to fall to match
the given value on the R.H.S. This interacts with the R.H.S. of (2.10) to achieve equilibrium in
the foreign exchange market. The effect of current period exchange rate becomes more pronounced
because the expectation of next period exchange rate is static - invariant to current information set
9
about the future. 7 Eventually in the final equilibrium interest rate effect in each period dominates
so that aggregate capital inflow to the developing country hovers around a stationary path. The
fluctuation around the stationary path is governed by the stochastic shocks to net exports. In
this model balance of trade has a dominant role in the determination of the intertemporal path of
foreign capital inflow. As a matter of fact the trajectory of capital inflow is almost a mirror image
of the trajectory of the exchange rate.
In Table 3 below we provide the mean and variance of the endogenous variables.
Table 3: Mean and variance of the endogenous variables
Variable Mean SD Coefficient of Variation
R∗t 0.1444 0.0015 0.0104
et 71.7915 4.4440 0.0619
Capital inflow 3.0516 0.4532 0.1485
The average exchange rate for the period of simulation turns out to be 71.7915 units of domestic
currency per unit of the foreign currency and the interest of the international market is 14.44%.
The aggregate equilibrium capital inflow to the developing country is 3.0516 units. It may be
noted that the mean and standard deviation of the endogenous variables reported in Table 3 are
valid for the values of the parameters and initial values of the endogenous variables as in Tables
1 and 2. Any change in one or more of the parameter values generates different dynamic paths
of the endogenous variables. Such exercises constitute comparative dynamics of the model. The
new mean and standard deviation of the endogenous variables summarize the change in the series
corresponding to new parameter values.
3 Comparative Dynamic Analysis
We consider changes in some of the parameter values of interest for a better understanding of the
economics of foreign capital inflow with emphasis on the primary focus of the model. It may be
noted that for the comparative dynamic analysis we have retained the same realised values of shock
to the net export function to make comparisons meaningful. The set of baseline trajectory of the
endogenous variables are plotted in black while the new set are plotted in red throughout this
paper.
3.1 Change in risk perception of the developed country banks, γ
An increase in γ implies that banks in the developed country perceive a higher risk for a given
level of expected profit (see equation (2.2)). In this particular exercise γ is raised from 4 to 15.
7If the expectation formation is in tune with rational expectations hypothesis then current exchange rate also
reflects expected exchange rate provided the foreign exchange market is efficient. In such a situation dynamic terms
of trade effect may not be as strong as observed here.
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The change corresponds to a dramatic shift in the risk perception and often happens during the
episodes of crisis. Then a typical bank in the developed country supplies lower amount of funds
in the international market. As a result aggregate supply of foreign loans decreases resulting into
increase in the international rate R∗t . In the final equilibrium capital inflow to the developing
country decreases and international rate increases for each t.
Figure 4: Effect of increased γ on capital inflow (Bottom plot for higher γ)
Figure 5: Effect of increased γ on R∗t (Top plot for higher γ)
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Figure 6: Effect of increased γ on et (difference with baseline)
Figs. 4 and 5 depict the new intertemporal trajectory (in red) of the capital inflow and the
international interest rate along with the baseline (in black). The trajectory of capital inflow
shows a downward shift from the original trajectory while the international interest rate shifts up.
However, there is very little change in the exchange rate. To get a clear picture we plotted the
difference of the new exchange rate from its baseline for each t and plotted them in Fig. 6. The
trajectory follows a stationary path around zero within a band from -0.027 to 0.02. There is no
appreciable change in the exchange rate because the shock does not affect the net exports and so
the balance of trade which as we argued earlier has a dominating role in the determination of the
equilibrium trajectories.
Table 4: Mean and variance of variables-increased γ
Variable Mean SD Coefficient of Variation
R∗t 0.1602 0.0057 0.0356
et 71.7937 4.4425 0.0619
capital inflow 2.5597 0.3543 0.1384
The averages for the new values of the endogenous variables also confirm this. There is a decrease
in the average foreign capital inflow from 3.0516 to 2.5597 which is expected because of the increase
in borrowing rate R∗t . However, the percentage fall in foreign capital inflow 16.12% is more than
the rise in R∗t 10.94%. The increase in risk perception, γ is 275% from its initial value. The rate of
change in the average capital inflow with respect to γ is -0.0447 while the rate of change of R∗t is
0.00014. The elasticity of capital inflow and interest rate with respect to γ are -0.0379 and 0.0014
(evaluated at sample averages). Clearly the sensitivity of capital inflow to risk perception is much
higher than the sensitivity of interest rate.
12
3.2 Effect of a rise in Et(
et+1
et
): Expected depreciation of exchange rate
When banks in the developing country (borrowers in the developing country in general) expect a
depreciation of exchange rate in the future, meaning an increase in the expected exchange rate vis-
a`-vis current rate, Et(
et+1
et
), cost of borrowing (in terms of foreign currency) increases. This change
in expectation leads to a decrease in the demand for foreign borrowing which in turn reduces R∗t
in the final equilibrium in each period. Et(
et+1
et
) is raised from 0.92 to 0.98 (6.52% rise), with
no change in the other parameter values. Comparing the new intertemporal trajectory with the
baseline trajectory we find that the capital inflow attains a low level trajectory though the nature
of the time path remains similar to the baseline trajectory.
Figure 7: Effect of depreciation of E( et+1et ) on capital inflow (Bottom plot for higher E(
et+1
et
))
Figure 8: Effect of depreciation of E( et+1et ) on et (difference from baseline)
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Figure 9: Effect of depreciation of E( et+1et ) on R
∗
t (Bottom plot for higher E(
et+1
et
))
Table 5: Mean and variance of variables - Increased E( et+1et )
Variable Mean SD Coefficient of Variation
R∗t 0.1433 0.0013 0.0087
et 71.7883 4.4439 0.0619
capital inflow 1.0399 0.3934 0.3783
Comparing the summary statistics reported in Table 5 with the baseline summary statistics reveals
that capital inflow decreases by 65.92% and R∗t decreases by 0.76% on an average. The rate of
change of capital inflow with respect to expected exchange rate is -33.53 which is much higher than
the rate of change of interest rate (-0.0183). The elasticities of capital inflow and interest rate with
respect to expected exchange rate are found to be -15.57 and -0.121. The current exchange rate
does not change to any appreciable level. Difference of the current exchange rate from the baseline
plotted in Fig. 8 shows that the range of variation is not significant (from −0.14 to 0.07). The
behaviour of the endogenous variables as depicted in the figures are also confirm from the respective
averages over the periods provided in Table 5.
3.3 Decrease in the productivity of the domestic sector of the developing coun-
try, Et(η)
When there is a decrease in the productivity of the domestic sector of the developing country,
Et(ηt), profit in the production sector falls which in turn leads to decreased demand for foreign
loans by the developing countries. We conduct this exercise by reducing Et(ηt) reduced from 0.85
to 0.70 (roughly 17.64% decrease). Given below the plots of endogenous variables with the new
Et(ηt).
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Figure 10: Effect of a lower Et(η) on Capital Inflow (Bottom plot for lower Et(η))
Figure 11: Effect of a lower Et(η) on R
∗
t (Bottom plot for lower Et(η))
15
Figure 12: Effect of a lower Et(η) on et (in difference)
From the plot it is seen that the whole trajectory of R∗t as well as the trajectory of the capital
inflow shift below. Comparing the averages with that of the baseline (see Table 6) it is evident that
there is no appreciable change in et while there is fall in both the capital inflow and R
∗
t by 6.73%
and 0.004% respectively. Thus the fall capital inflow is much higher and the fall in R∗t is a slightly
lower compared to the decrease in productivity, E(ηt). The rate of change of capital inflow with
respect to E(ηt) is 6.7 while that for R
∗
t is 0.004 and the corresponding elasticities are 2.05 and
0.022 respectively.
Table 6: Mean and variance of variables-shock to Et(η)
Variable Mean SD Coefficient of Variation
R∗t 0.1438 0.0014 0.0096
et 71.7896 4.4437 0.0619
capital inflow 2.0415 0.4212 0.2063
An increase in the production cost in the developing country has similar effect as the decrease in the
productivity. Such increases can occur due to increase in the price of inputs, wages, interest rate
or price of raw materials. A very common cause of increased production cost arises due to increase
in the prices of imported inputs, particularly crude petroleum and generates balance of payments
crisis. The comparative dynamic analyses considered above show that the international interest
rate is less sensitive to changes in the parameter values than capital inflow. This is true whether
the parametric changes occur in the developed country or in the developing country. A comparison
of the elasticities of capital inflow and rate of interest in the international loan market with respect
to the parameter values reveals that responsiveness with respect to the expected exchange rate
in the next period far exceeds the responsiveness with respect to the risk perception of loans of
the developed country banks or productivity of the domestic sector of the developing country
(borrowing firms in the developing country). However, the behaviour of the current exchange rate
16
is governed by the behaviour of the net exports. It is seldom affected by the change in the expected
exchange rate. This is because of the fact that the nature of expectation of the exchange rate is
static, expectation of future exchange rate is invariant with respect to behaviour of the current
exchange rate.
The above analyses can be useful for an analysis of the potential of financial crisis in this model.
All the above three cases have the potential for generating financial crisis when foreign capital
inflow drops to a very low level; in the extreme case it can hit the horizontal axis as in Figs. 4
and 10 leading to what can be called sudden stop a la Calvo (1998). As a matter of fact in the
case of a sudden stop it is very difficult for the borrowing country to come back to its original
position. However, the crisis, in this model does not occur because of imperfection in the loan
market resulting into binding finance constraints for firms which becomes profound with goods
price rigidity as in Aghion et al(2000). It is not the fallout of classic problem of moral hazard
or adverse selection (Krugman, 1998). Nor it is (mis)information issue that has been ascribed
very important role in the sense of herd behaviour discussed by Kindleberger (1978) and formally
modelled by Banerjee (1992).
We have shown that a favourable foreign capital inflow can turn into a crisis even when macroe-
conomic fundamentals are good. In view of the such vulnerability of unrestricted capital flow to
financial crisis eminent economists such as Bhagwati (1998), Ostroy et al (2010), Rodrick (1998)
have suggested policy to tax capital out flow, such as Tobin type tax in general even when macroe-
conomic fundamentals show good performance and Sen (2006) in particular has argued against full
capital account convertibility for the Indian economy.
4 Conclusion
The study addresses the economics of foreign capital inflow based on trade theoretic explanation
operating via terms of trade effect in a dynamic context. The model is set up and solved in a two
country group framework - developing or borrowing group and developed or lending group. Each
individual agent in both the country groups chooses her respective loan portfolio for each period by
optimization of an intertemporal objective function of mean-variance variety. The equilibrium in the
loan market together with the foreign exchange market solves the endogenous variables of the model
using numerical methods. Net exports which constitutes the supply side of the foreign exchange
market dominates intertemporal trajectory of endogenous variables. Simulation exercises are then
conducted to derive comparative dynamic results to assess the impact of shocks to parameters of
the model on the intertemporal trajectory of the endogenous variables, viz. international interest
rate, foreign capital inflow and exchange rate.
Given the structure of the model a change in the risk perception in the developed country reduces
capital inflow to the developing country group as a whole. An increase in the expected exchange
rate vis-a`-vis the current exchange rate raises the effective cost of foreign loans leading to a decrease
in demand which in the final equilibrium also reduces the international interest rate. A fall in the
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productivity in the domestic sector of the developing country leads to a fall in foreign capital inflow
and a fall in the international interest rate. However, the responsiveness with respect to expected
exchange rate vis-a`-vis current exchange rate is much more compared to the other comparative
dynamic analyses considered here.
The paper can be extended in several directions. A restrictive assumption of the model is static
expectation of exchange rate. An extension with endogenous determination of expected exchange
rate is capable to add richer dynamics to the model. Another interesting extension could be the
endogeneity of risk of default that is dependent on the outstanding borrowing of the developing
countries. Finally, a multi country extension within the borrowing country group can be undertaken
to show the contagion effect when a shock originating in one of the borrowing countries spreads to
the other members of the group.
5 Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1: From (2.3)
a+ bFt + cF
2
t = maxµt{ΩDt +BDEt(V D(Ft+1)},
where
ΩDt = Ft(1− µt)(1 +RDt ) + Ftµt(1 +R∗t )Et(t)− (γ/2)F 2t µ2t (1 +R∗)
2
t Vt(t)
and
Et(Ft+1) = Ft[(1− µt)(1 +RDt ) + µt(1 +R∗t )Et(t)]− (1 + rDt )KDt +KDt+1.
To solve this, denote MDt = Ω
D
t +B
D[a+ bEt(Ft+1) + cEt(F
2
t+1)], then the value function takes the
form,
V D(Ft) = maxµt{MDt }.
First order condition to the above equation yields
∂MDt
∂µ∗t
|µ∗t = 0. (5.1)
Now,
∂ΩDt
∂µ∗t
= −Ft(1 +RDt ) + Ft(1 +R∗t )Et(t)− γF 2t µt(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t).
⇒ ∂Et(Ft+1)
∂µ∗t
= −Ft(1 +RDt ) + Ft(1 +R∗t )Et(t).
⇒ Et(F 2t+1) = Vt(Ft+1) + (Et(Ft+1))2.
Now,
∂(Et(Ft+1))
2
∂µ∗t
= 2Et(Ft+1)
∂Et(Ft+1)
∂µ∗t
and,
Vt(Ft+1) = µ
2
t (1 +R
∗
t )
2F 2t Vt(t).
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Thus,
∂Vt(Ft+1)
∂µ∗t
= 2µt(1 +R
∗
t )
2F 2t Vt(t)
⇒ ∂M
D
t
∂µ∗t
|µ∗t =
∂ΩDt
∂µ∗t
+BDb
∂Et(Ft+1)
∂µ∗t
+BDc
∂Vt(Ft+1)
∂µ∗t
+BDc
∂(Et(Ft+1))
2
∂µ∗t
.
This implies,
0 = −Ft(1 +RDt ) + Ft(1 +R∗t )Et(t)− γF 2t µt(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)
+BDb[−Ft(1 +RDt ) + Ft(1 +R∗t )Et(t)] +BDc[2µt(1 +R∗t )2F 2t Vt(t)]
+2BDc[Ft[(1− µt)(1 +RDt ) + µt(1 +R∗t )Et(t)]− rDtk]
×[−Ft(1 +RDt ) + Ft(1 +R∗t )Et(t)].
(5.2)
Rearranging,
µ∗t =
FtZt[(1 +B
Db) + 2BDcFt(1 +R
D
t )− 2BDcrDtk]
F 2t [γ(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t)− 2BDc(Z2t + (1 +R∗t )2Vt(t))]
=
Zt[(1 +B
Db) + 2BDcFt(1 +R
D
t )− 2BDcrDtk]
Ft[γ(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)− 2BDc(Z2t + (1 +R∗t )2Vt(t))]
(5.3)
with
Zt = [(1 +R
∗
t )Et(t)− (1 +RDt )] (5.4)
and
rDtk = (1 + rt)K
D
t −KDt+1, (5.5)
where b and c are determined as given below. Let µ∗tbe the optimum portfolio, then the optimum
portfolio satisfies a+bFt+cF
2
t = Ω
D
t (Ft, µ
∗
t )+B
DEt(V (Ft+1)(µ
∗
t )) from equation (2.3) This equation
holds for every Ft, so a, b, c are determined by comparing coefficients of Ft , F
2
t and constant on
both the sides of the equation. This implies
a+ bFt + cF
2
t = Ft[(1− µ∗t )(1 +RDt ) + µ∗t (1 +R∗t )Et(t)]−
γ
2
F 2t µ
∗
t
2(1 +R∗t )
2Vt() +B
Da
+BDb[Ft[(1− µ∗t )(1 +RDt ) + µ∗t (1 +R∗t )Et(t)]− (1 + rDt )KDt +KDt+1]
+BDc[(Et(Ft+1))
2 + Vt(Ft+1)]. (5.6)
This is so because Et(F
2
t+1) = (Et(Ft+1))
2 +Vt(Ft+1) Comparing the coefficients of F
2
t on both the
sides of the equation, the following equality is obtained:
c = (1 +R∗t )
2Vt(t)
(
2BDc(1 +RDt )Zt
µdenom
)2
(−(γ/2) +BDc) + (1 +RD)2BDc+ (2B
Dc(1 +RDt )Zt)
2
µdenom
,
(5.7)
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where µdenom = (γ − 2BDc)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)− 2BDcZ2t . This yields,
µ2denomc(1−BD(1 +RDt )2) = (2BDc(1 +RDt )Zt)2[µdenom − (1/2)(γ − 2BDc)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)]
⇒
(A− cE)2(1− T ) = 2cZ2tBDT (A− cE1)
⇒ ( as c 6= 0, otherwise the value function would be linear
(A2 + c2E2 − 2cAE)(1− T ) = 2cZ2tBDT (A− cE1)
⇒
0 = c2(E2(1− T ) + 2Z2tBDTE1)− 2c(AE(1− T ) + Z2tBDTA) +A2(1− T )
(5.8)
where A = γ(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t), E = 2BD(Z2t + (1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)) = 2BD(Z2t +
A
γ ), T = B
D(1 +RDt )
2
and E1 = 2B
D(Z2t +
A
2γ ). Hence, Note, since A, E and T all are positive, the coefficient of c in (5.8)
is negative. Therefore, if 0 < T ≤ 1, then all solution of c are positive real, as the discriminant
is positive, since for 0 < T ≤ 1, A2E2(1 − T )2 = A2E2(1 − T )2, 2BDZ2tA2ET (1 − T ) ≥
2BDZ2tA
2E1T (1−T ) and (BD)2Z4t A2T 2 > 0. Hence, the necessary condition is T > 1. But then
the discriminant may not always be positive as the 2nd condition may not always hold and the
coefficient of c2 may also be negative. So, the main idea would be to choose BD, such that T > 1,
i.e, coefficient of c0 is negative, but the coefficient of c2 is positive. For T > 1, when coefficient of
c2 is positive then there exists exactly one solution of c which is negative. Therefore c < 0 if and
only if BD(1 +RDt )
2 > 1 and
(1 +RDt )
2(Z2t + (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t))
2 > T [(Z2t + (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t))
2 − Z2t (Z2t + (1/2)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t))2]
= T [(3/2)Z2t (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t) + ((1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t))
2
⇔ BD(1 +RDt )2 <
(Z2t + (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t))
2
(3/2)Z2t (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(t) + ((1 +R∗t )2Vt(t))2
.
(5.9)
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For the coefficient of Ft,
b = 2BDc
Z2t (1 +R
D
t )
µdenom
+ (1 +RDt )−
γ
2
(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(t)4B
Dc(1 +RDt )
Z2t
µ2denom
[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk]
+BDb[(1 +RD) +
Z2t
µ2denom
2BDc(1 +RDt )] +B
Dc[
2Z2t (1 +R
D
t )
µdenom
[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk]
+
2Z4t (1 +R
D
t )
µ2denom
2BDc[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk]− 2rDtk[(1 +RDt ) + 2BDc
Z2t (1 +R
D
t )
µdenom
]]
+BDc(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(t)4B
Dc(1 +RDt )
Z2t
µ2denom
[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk]
= (1 +RDt )(1 + 2B
Dc
Z2t
µdenom
)[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk]
+2BDc(1 +RDt )
Z2t
µdenom
(1 + 2BDc
Z2t
µdenom
)[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk]
+(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(t)4B
Dc
Z2t
µ2denom
)[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk][BDc−
γ
2
]
= [(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk](1 +RDt )(1 + 2BDc
Z2t
µdenom
)(1 + 2BDc
Z2t
µdenom
)
+[(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk](1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)4BDc(1 +RDt )
Z2t
µ2denom
)[BDc− γ
2
]
= [(1 +BDb)− 2BDcrDtk][(1 +RDt )(1 + 2BDc
Z2t
µdenom
)2
−(γ
2
−BDc)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)4BDc(1 +RDt )
Z2t
µ2denom
]. (5.10)
This implies,
b(1−BDL) = (1− 2BDcrDtk)L
⇒
b =
(1− 2BDcrDtk)L
1−BDL , (5.11)
where
L = (1 +RDt )
(
1 +
2BDcZ2t
µdenom
)2
− (γ − 2BDc)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)(1 +RDt )
2BDcZ2t
µ2denom
= (1 +RDt )
(
1− −2B
DcZ2t
µdenom
)2
+ (1 +RDt )
(γ − 2BDc)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t)
µdenom
−2BDcZ2t
µdenom
= (1 +RDt )
(
1− −2B
DcZ2t
µdenom
)2
+ (1 +RDt )
(
1− −2B
DcZ2t
µdenom
) −2BDcZ2t
µdenom
, (5.12)
since µdenom − (γ − 2BDc)(1 +R∗t )2Vt(t) = −2BDcZ2t . Hence,
L = (1 +RDt )
(
1− −2B
DcZ2t
µdenom
)[
1− −2B
DcZ2t
µdenom
+
−2BDcZ2t
µdenom
]
= (1 +RDt )
(
1− −2B
DcZ2t
µdenom
)
. (5.13)
This immediately implies that BDL < 1, as z is negative and
−2BDcZ2t
µdenom
< 1. Also, note
1 +BDb =
(1− 2BDcrDtk(BDL))
1−BDL .
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Positivity of the µ∗t may be found from the condition as given below.
µ∗t > 0 ⇔
1− 2BDcrDtk(BDL)
1−BDL + 2B
Dc[Ft(1 +R
D
t )− rDtk] > 0
⇔ 1− 2BDcrDtk(BDL) + 2BDc(1−BDL)[Ft(1 +RDt )− rDtk] > 0
⇔ 1− 2BDcrDtk + 2BDc(1−BDL)[Ft(1 +RDt )] > 0
⇔ 2BDc[rDtk − (1−BDL)[Ft(1 +RDt )]] < 1. (5.14)
If rDtk > (1−BDL)[Ft(1 +RDt )], then it always holds as c < 0. This should be the case, as it means
Ft, is tool small compared to r
D
tk. On the other hand, if r
D
tk < (1 − BDL)[Ft(1 + RDt )], which is
often the case, then there exists γ1 > 0 such that, γ < γ1 would imply the last condition, as c is
linear in γ. This means if the loan do not have too high a risk premium then µ∗t > 0.
Again, the condition for µ∗t < 1 may be found from below:
µ∗t < 1 ⇔ Zt
(
1− 2BDcrDtk(BDL)
1−BDL + 2B
Dc[Ft(1 +R
D
t )− rDtk]
)
< µdenomFt
⇔ Zt
(
(1− 2BDcrDtk(BDL)) + 2BDc(1−BDL)[Ft(1 +RDt )− rDtk]
)
< µdenomFt(1−BDL)
⇔ Zt
(
(1− 2BDcrDtk) + 2BDc(1−BDL)[Ft(1 +RDt )]
)
< µdenomFt(1−BDL)
⇔ Zt < Ft(1−BDL)µdenom + 2BDcZt[rDtk − (1−BDL)Ft(1 +RDt )]. (5.15)
Since µdenom is linear in γ, as c is, from (5.14) it is clear that there exists 0 < γ0 < γ1, such that
for γ > γ0 the last condtion holds. This means if the riskpremium is to low then there is always a
possibility of over-subscription of lending.
Hence the proof of existence of µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) for γ ∈ (γ0, γ1). Upper bound γ1 may be infinity if Ft
remains too small.
6 Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 2: To solve the maximization problem, denote
MUt = Ω
U
t +B
UEt(V
U (Gt+1)).
Then
V U (Gt) = maxλtM
U
t .
First order condition for maximization implies,
∂MUt
∂λt
|λt=λ∗t = 0 (6.1)
Now,
∂ΩUt
∂λt
= KUt At + βλtK
U2
t (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)
where,
At = (1 + r
U
t )− (1 +R∗t )Et(
et+1
et
).
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Further,
Et(Gt+1) = Et(ηt)(1 +R
U
t )Gt −KUt [(1− λt)(1 + rUt ) + λt(1 +R∗t )Et(
et+1
et
)] +KUt+1.
So,
∂Et(Gt+1)
∂λt
= KUt At,
and, Et(G
2
t+1) = (Et(Gt+1))
2 + Vt(Gt+1).
Now,
∂(Et(Gt+1)
2
∂λt
= 2Et(Gt+1)
∂Et(Gt+1
∂λt
⇒ Vt(Gt+1) = KU2t λ2t (1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
) + Vt(e
∫ t
0 θ
2
udutat)G
2
t (1 +R
U
t )
2.
Thus
∂Vt(Gt+1)
∂λt
= 2KU
2
t λt(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
).
⇒ ∂M
U
t
∂λt
=
∂ΩUt
∂λt
+BUy
∂Et(Gt+1)
∂λt
+BUz
∂Vt(Gt+1)
∂λt
+BUz
∂(Et(Gt+1))
2
∂λt
.
This implies,
0 = KUt At − βλtKU
2
t (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
) +BUy(AtK
U
t ) +B
Uz[2KU
2
t λt(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)]
+2BUz(AtK
U
t )[(Et(ηt)(1 +R
U
t )Gt −KUt [(1− λt)(1 + rUt ) + λt(1 +R∗t )Et(
et+1
et
)] +KUt+1].
Rearranging,
λ∗t =
KUt At[(1 +B
Uy) + 2BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)Gt − 2BUzrUtk]
KU
2
t [(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)(β − 2BUz)− 2BUzA2t ]
=
At[(1 +B
Uy) + 2BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)Gt − 2BUzrUtk]
KUt [(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)(β − 2BUz)− 2BUzA2t ]
(6.2)
where
rUtk = K
U
t (1 + r
U
t )−KUt+1
x, y, z are determined as in below. If λ∗t is optimal then
x+ yGt + zG
2
t = Ω
U
t (Gt, λ
∗
t ) +B
UEt(V
U (Gt+1)). (6.3)
x, y, z are obtained by comparing the coefficients of Gt, G
2
t and constants on both the sides of the
equation. Substituting for value function Et(V
U (Gt+1)) we get z = −β2 (1+RUt )2Vt(ηt)+BUz(coeff
of G2t in (Et(Gt+1))
2 +BUz(coeff of G2t in Vt(Gt+1)), i.e.,
for the coefficient of G2t ,
z = −β
2
[(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt) + (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)
A2t
λ2denom
4(BU )2z2(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2]
+BUz[(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2 +
A4t
λ2denom
4(BU )2z2(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2 +
A2t
λdenom
4BUz(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2]
+BUz[(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt) + (1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)
A2t
λ2denom
4(BU )2z2(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2], (6.4)
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where λdenom = [(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)(β − 2BUz)− 2BUzA2t ]. This implies,
zλ2denom = λ
2
denom(1 +R
U
t )
2Vt(ηt)[B
Uz − β
2
]
+(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)A2t 4(B
U )2z2(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2[BUz − β
2
]
+BUz(1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2[λ2denom +A
4
t 4(B
U )2z2 + λdenomA
2
t 4B
Uz]. (6.5)
Note that, if we bring everything to the left and equate it to zero, we obtain, coefficient of z3 as,
(2BU )2H2 − (2BU )2H2BU (1 +RUt )2Vt(ηt)− (2BU )2(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)A2t (1 +R
U
t )
2(Et(ηt))
2BU
−(2BU )2(1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2H2BU − (2BU )2A4t (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2BU
−(2BU )2A2t (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2(−2BU )H
= (2BU )2H2[1−BU (1 +RUt )2Vt(ηt)−BU (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2] + (2BU )2A2t (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2BUH,
(6.6)
whereH = (A2t+(1+R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)). This coefficient is positive if BU (1+RUt )
2[Vt(ηt)+(Et(ηt))
2] < 1,
i.e., BU (1 +RUt )
2Et(η
2
t ) < 1.
Now, the coefficient of z0, in the similar expression as above is,
β
2
(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt)[(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)β]2,
which is positive. Since the coefficient of z3 and z0 are both positive it guarantees a negative
solution of z.
If we can get a condition which gives the coefficient of z to be negative then the Descartes’ rule of
sign says there is at most one negative root.
Now the coefficient of z is,
[(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)β]2 −BU (1 +RUt )2Vt(ηt)[(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)β]2
+(β/2)(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt)(−4BU )H[(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)β]
−BU (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2[(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)β]2
= [(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)β]2[1− 3BU (1 +RUt )2Vt(ηt)−BU (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2]
−2β2BU (1 +RUt )2Vt(ηt)A2t (1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
). (6.7)
This expression is negative if,
3BU (1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt) +B
U (1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))
2 > 1. (6.8)
Thus there exists exactly one negative solution z if and only if
1
3(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt) + (1 +RUt )
2(Et(ηt))2
< BU <
1
(1 +RUt )
2[Vt(ηt) + (Et(ηt))2]
. (6.9)
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For the coefficient of z2, in a0 + a1z + a2z
2 + a3z
3 = 0 is
−4BUH(β(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)−BU (1 +RUt )2[(Et(ηt))2 + Vt(ηt)][(−4BU )H(β(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)]
+(β/2)(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt)(−2BU )2H2 + (β/2)(1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)A2t 4(B
U )2
−BU (1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2A2t 4BU (1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)β
= −4BUH(β(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
) + 4(BU )2(1 +RUt )
2Et(η
2
t )H(β(1 +R
∗
t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)
+(β/2)4(BU )2(1 +RUt )
2Vt(ηt)H
2 − (β/2)4(BU )2(1 +RUt )2(Et(ηt))2(1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)A2t .(6.10)
For the coefficient of Gt,
y = (1 +RUt )Et(ηt) +
A2t
λdenom
2BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)
−β
2
(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2A2t
λ2denom
2BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[(1 +B
Uy)− 2BUzrUtk]]
+BUy[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt) +
A2t
λdenom
2BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
+BUz[2(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
A2t
λdenom
[(1 +BUy)− 2BUzrUtk]− rUtk]
+
A2t
λdenom
4BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
A2t
λdenom
[(1 +BUy)− 2BUzrUtk]− rUtk]]
+BUz(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
A2t
λ2denom
4BUz(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[(1 +B
Uy)− 2BUzrUtk]].
(6.11)
This implies
y = (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+BUy[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+BUz[2(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
A2t
λdenom
[(1 +BUy)− 2BUzrUtk]− rUtk]][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[(1 +B
Uy)− 2BUzrUtk]][2BUz − β].
(6.12)
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Thus,
y = (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
] +BUy[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+BUy[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
2BUzA2t
λdenom
][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]]
+BUz[2(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
A2t
λdenom
[1− 2BUzrUtk]− rUtk]][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+BUy(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][2B
Uz − β].
+(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1− 2BUzrUtk]][2BUz − β].
(6.13)
Therefore,
y = (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
] +BUy[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]2
+BUz[2(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
A2t
λdenom
[1− 2BUzrUtk]− rUtk]][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+BUy(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][2B
Uz − β].
+(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1− 2BUzrUtk]][2BUz − β].
(6.14)
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Hence,
y[1− J1 + J2] = (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+BUz[2(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[
A2t
λdenom
[1− 2BUzrUtk]− rUtk]][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+(1 +R∗t )
2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1− 2BUzrUtk]][2BUz − β]
= (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
2BUzA2t
λdenom
[1− 2BUzrUtk][1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
+(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)(−2BUzrUtk)[1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
−(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1− 2BUzrUtk][
(β − 2BUz)(1 +R∗t )2Vt( et+1et )
λdenom
][
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
= (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
][1− 2BUzrUtk]
+[(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
2BUzA2t
λdenom
[1− 2BUzrUtk][1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
−(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1− 2BUzrUtk][1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
][
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]
= (1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1−
−2BUzA2t
λdenom
][1− 2BUzrUtk],
(6.15)
since λdenom − (β − 2BUz)(1 +R∗t )2Vt( et+1et ) = −2BUzA2t , where
J1 = B
U [(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][1 +
2BUzA2t
λdenom
]2, and
J2 = B
U (1 +R∗t )2Vt(
et+1
et
)[
2BUzA2t
λ2denom
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)][β − 2BUz].
As in L (5.12) and (5.13) in the computation of y, the expression for J1 − J2 can be simplified
further. Note,
J1 − J2 = BU [(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
[(
1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
)2
+
(β − 2BUz)(1 +R∗t )2Vt( et+1et )
λdenom
(−2BUzA2t
λdenom
)]
= BU [(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
[(
1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
)2
+
(
1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
)(−2BUzA2t
λdenom
)]
= BU [(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
[(
1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
)[(
1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
)
+
(−2BUzA2t
λdenom
)]]
= BU [(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
(
1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
)
= BUJ, (6.16)
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where J = [(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)]
(
1− −2BUzA2tλdenom
)
. Thus,
y =
(1 +RUt )Et(ηt)[1− −2B
UzA2t
λdenom
][1− 2BUzrUtk]
1−BUJ
=
J(1− 2BUzrUtk)
(1−BUJ) . (6.17)
From this, y can be found immediately once the z is known.
Now (6.17) further implies
1 +BUy =
(1− 2BUzrUtk(BUJ))
1−BUJ .
Positivity of the λ∗t may be found from the condition as given below:
λ∗t > 0 ⇔
1− 2BUzrUtk(BUJ)
1−BDJ + 2B
Uz[Gt(1 +R
U
t )E(ηt)− rUtk] > 0
⇔ 1− 2BUzrUtk(BUJ) + 2BUz(1−BDJ)[Gt(1 +RUt )E(ηt)− rUtk] > 0
⇔ 1− 2BUzrUtk + 2BUz(1−BDJ)[Gt(1 +RUt )E(ηt)] > 0
⇔ 2BUz[rUtk − (1−BDJ)[Gt(1 +RUt )E(ηt)]] < 1. (6.18)
If rUtk > (1 − BUJ)[Gt(1 + RUt )E(ηt)], then it always holds as z < 0. This should be the case,
as it means Gt, is tool small compared to r
D
tk (or perhaps negative). On the other hand, if r
U
tk <
(1 − BUJ)[Gt(1 + RUt )E(ηt)], then there exists β1 > 0 such that, β < β1 would imply the last
condition, as z is linear in β. This means if the loan do not have too high a risk premium then
λ∗t > 0.
Since λdenom is linear in β, as z is, from (6.18) it is clear that there exists 0 < β0 < β1, such that
for β > β0 the last condtion holds. This means if the risk premium is too low then there is always
a possibility of over-subscription of borrowing.
Hence the proof of existence of λ∗t ∈ (0, 1) for β ∈ (β0, β1). Upper bound β1 may be infinity if Gt
remains too small or negative.
Similarly, the condition for λ∗t < 1 may be found from below:
λ∗t < 1 ⇔ At
(
1− 2BUzrUtk(BUJ)
1−BUJ + 2B
Uz[Gt(1 +R
U
t )E(ηt)− rUtk]
)
< λdenomK
U
t
⇔ At
(
(1− 2BUzrUtk(BUJ)) + 2BUz(1−BUJ)[Gt(1 +RUt )E(ηt)− rUtk]
)
< λdenomK
U
t (1−BUJ)
⇔ At
(
(1− 2BUzrUtk) + 2BUz(1−BUJ)[Gt(1 +RUt )E(ηt)]
)
< λdenomK
U
t (1−BUJ)
⇔ At < (1−BUJ)λdenomKUt + 2BUzAt
(
rUtk − (1−BUJ)Gt(1 +RUt )E(ηt)
)
. (6.19)
Since λdenom is linear in β, as z is, from (6.18) it is clear that there exists 0 < β0 < β1, such that
for β > β0 the last condtion holds. This means if the risk premium is too low then there is always
a possibility of over-subscription of borrowing.
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Hence the proof of existence of λ∗t ∈ (0, 1) for β ∈ (β0, β1). Upper bound β1 may be infinity if Gt
remains too small or negative.
Since it has multiple roots, we consider only those roots which belong to [0,1].8 9
Remark: Since Zt > 0 and At > 0, are the economic requirement for the flow of Capital, we still
have the same restrictions on R∗t , as
(1 +RDt )
Et(t)
< (1 +R∗t ) <
(1 + rUt )
Et(
et+1
et
)
.
Besides, hypothesis of Theorem 3 is also required, i.e.,
N20 > 4N1m
UKUt ,
to have a solution for (R∗t , et).
7 Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 3: Define
L1(R
∗
t , et) = m
Dµ∗tFt −
mUλ∗tKUt
et
and
L2(R
∗
t , et) = N1e
2
t − (N0 + Ct−1)et +mUλ∗tKUt (7.1)
where Ct−1 =
mU (1+R∗t−1)λ
∗
t−1K
U
t−1
e∗t−1
. Note, L2 is a quadratic function of et for every R
∗
t . Thus,
equating L2 with zero to get
et =
(N0 + Ct−1)±
√
(N0 + Ct−1)2 − 4N1mUλ∗tKUt
2N1
. (7.2)
Since N1 > 0 and N0 +Ct−1 > 0, (7.2) has a unique positive solution if and only if (N0 +Ct−1)2 >
4N1m
Uλ∗tKUt . But the later holds if N20 > 4N1mUKUt as λ∗t ∈ (0, 1) by Theorem 1.
Again, from the assumption of Theorems 1 and 2,
(1 +RDt )
Et(t)
< (1 +R∗t ) <
(1 + rUt )
Et(
et+1
et
)
. (7.3)
Thus, for every et, L1 is positive if (1 +R
∗
t ) =
(1+rUt )
Et(
et+1
et
)
(i.e., R∗t =
(1+rUt )
Et(
et+1
et
)
− 1) as At = 0 implies
λ∗t = 0. Similarly, for every et, L1 is negative if (1 + R∗t ) =
(1+RDt )
Et(t)
, (i.e., R∗t =
(1+RDt )
Et(t)
− 1 > 0)
as Zt = 0 implies µ
∗
t = 0. Also, for every et, L1 is clearly an increasing function of R
∗
t . Hence
there exist an unique positive solution of R∗t for the equation L1 = 0 for every et. However, unique
positive solution et is guaranteed by the above assumption of the Theorem 3. Hence the proof.
8uniroot command in rootSolve package in R is used for the root approximation in a specified interval.
9Here too, for some parametric configurations, existence of root in [0,1] is not guaranteed. 1− λ∗t < 0 ⇒ λ∗t > 1,
excessive borrowing, generally happens whenever accumulated funds at time period t of a bank in the developing
country Gt is less than the total foreign loan taken by the bank.
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8 Appendix D
Algorithm of simulation
• Start with initial values of endogenous variables R∗0 = 0.14 and e∗0 = 40 and other parametric
values.
• Calculate µ∗0 and λ∗0 from R∗0 using equations (5.3) and (6.2) respectively.
• To calculate et, R∗t , λ∗t and µ∗t at each t, fixed point iteration method is used. This is a version
of majorize-minimization or an E-M algorithm in a dynamic context.
• Step 1: Start with an initial value λtj , calculate etj given λ∗tj using (2.12)
• Step 2: λ∗tj = constantµ∗tj ⇒ λ∗tj = f(R∗tj) from (5.3)
• Step 3: As λ∗tj is given(initial value), R∗tj is determined as the root of above polynomial.
• Step 4: Obtaining R∗t , update λ∗t(j+1) using (6.2),go back to step 1 and repeat the process
until each variable converges.
• Step 5: Having obtained all the exogenous variables at time period t, repeat the process to
get those values at time period t+ 1.
9 Appendix E
Distribution of t, ηt
, ηt are taken as two point random variables. Given two points and expectation, their variance
is fixed. Similarly given two points and variance, their expectation is fixed. So, for a two point
distribution expectation and variance cannot be arbitrarily chosen given two points. Here ηt take
values {1, η} and η is chosen in such a way to match expectation and variance and so do for
Et(t). ηt is simulated randomly from a distribution which satisfies the given expectation variance
property. Since V (ηt) is very low, Et(ηt) can be used as a random number simulator from the
unknown distribution.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest
Research involving Human Participants and/or Animals
Informed consent
30
References
[1] Allen, F., Gale, D.: Understanding Financial Crises, OUP: Oxford, UK, Clarendon Lecture in
Economics (2007)
[2] Banerjee, A. V.: A simple model of herd behaviour, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 797-
817 (1992).
[3] Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P., Banerjee, A.V.: A Simple Model of Monetary Policy and Currency
Crises, European Economic Review, 44, 728-38 (2000)
[4] Basak, G.K., Das, P.K., Marjit, S.: Foreign capital inflow, exchange rate dynamics and potential
financial crisis, Vol 103, page:673-684, Current science, India (2012)
[5] Bellman, R. and Dreyfus, S.: Applied Dynamic Programming, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, New Jersy The Bellman principal of optimality, online site of Rosu, I.,
http://webhost.hec.fr/rosu/research/notes/bellman.pdf (1962).
[6] Bhagwati, J.: The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Trade in
Dollars, Foreign Affairs, 77, 7-12 (1998)
[7] Bussie`re, M., Fratzscher, M., Koeniger, W.: Currency Mismatch, Uncertainty and Debt Matu-
rity Structure, ECB Working Paper Series No. 409 (2004)
[8] Calvo, G.A.: Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops,
Journal of Applied Economics, 1, 1, 35-54 (1998)
[9] Caves, R. E., Frankel, J. A., Jones, R. W.: World Trade and Payments: An Introduction, Sixth
Edition, Harper Collins College Publishers, New York (1993)
[10] Costinot, A., Lorenzoni, G., Werning, I.: A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-
Trade Manipulation, Journal of Political Economy, 122, 1, 77-128 (2014)
[11] Dominguez, K. M. E., Tesar, L.L.: International Borrowing and Macroeconomic Performance
in Argentina, NBER Working Paper No. 11353 (2005)
[12] Eichengreen, B., Hausmann, R. : Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, New Challenges for Monetary Policy, pp. 329-368 (1999)
[13] Eichengreen, B., Hausmann, R., Panizza, U. : The Pain of Original Sin, in Barry Eichengreen
and Ricardo Hausmann (eds.), Other People’s Money, University of Chicago Press: Chicago
(2005)
[14] Goldfajn, I., Minella, A.: Capital Flows and Controls in Brazil: What Have We Learned?
NBER Working Paper No. 11640 (2005)
[15] Gorton, G.: The Panic of 2007, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium 2008 (avail-
able at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sysmpos/2008/Gorton.10.04.08.pdf) (2008)
[16] Helpman, E., Krugman, P. A.: Trade Policy and Market Structure, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass (1989)
[17] Krugman, P. A.: What happened to Asia? Website of Paul A. Krugman (1998)
[18] Kindleberger, C.: Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of financial Crises, Basic Books:
New York (1978)
31
[19] Marjit, S., Das, P. K., Bardhan, S.: A portfolio based theory of foreign borrowing and capital
control in a small open economy, Research in International Business and Finance, 21, 175-187
(2007)
[20] Noland, M.: South Korea’s Experience with International Capital Flows, NBER Working
Paper No. 11381 (2005)
[21] Ostroy, J. D., Ghosh,A. R., Habermeier, K., Chamon, M., Qureshi, M., Reinhardt, D. B.S.:
Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls, IMF Staff Position Note No. SPN 10/04, IMF: Wasington
D.C. (2010)
[22] Rakshit, M.K.: The East Asian Currency Crisis, OUP: New Delhi (2002)
[23] Reinhart, V., Reinhart, C. M.: Capital Flows Bonanzas: AN Encompassing View of the Past
and Present, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6996, UK (2008)
[24] Reinhart, C. M., Rogoff, K.: This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly,
Princeton University Press, Princeton: New Jersy (2009)
[25] Rodrik, D.: Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility? Essays in International Finance 207,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University (1998)
[26] Sen, P.: Case Against Rushing into Full Capital Account Convertibility, Economic and Political
Weekly, 41, 19, 1853-1857 (2006)
[27] Wolf, M.: Fixing Global Finance, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore (2008)
[28] rootSolve package-http:// stat.ethz.ch / R-manual / R-patched / library / stats /html / uni-
root.html
32
